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I
t would appear to be obvious that the right way of thinking about the governance
issues associated with hedge funds is to think of them as mutual funds or money
managers. Hedge funds differ from other managed portfolios in a number of dimensions,
including the restriction of sales to qualified—that is, high net worth or institutional—
investors, lower transparency due to reduced reporting requirements, difficulties
in marking assets to market when they are highly illiquid (as is frequently the case),
and the widespread use of leverage, to name a few. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) clearly thinks of hedge funds as a type of closed-end mutual fund,
albeit one not covered by all provisions of the Investment Company Act (ICA) of 1940,
since the SEC now requires hedge funds to become registered investment advisers
under Rule 203(b)(3)-2. 
On this view, an analysis of the governance of hedge funds should proceed by
comparing and contrasting them with more highly regulated investment vehicles. Yet
only two of the ten TASS categories of hedge funds—emerging market and some, but
not all, global macro funds—are cut from this mold.
1 Fund-of-funds or multistrategy-
fund hedge fund managers might be viewed as less regulated ICA investment advis-
ers as well, but this fact would not facilitate our understanding of the governance
issues associated with the underlying hedge funds unless they functioned as less
restricted mutual funds or money managers.
2
My contention is that the corporate governance issues associated with most other
hedge funds and, to some extent, even with global macro and emerging market funds
should be viewed from a different perspective. Most hedge funds are organized as
limited partnerships, and I argue that other private partnerships or groups within
public companies that function in a manner similar to such partnerships comprise the
appropriate peer group. This view is hardly surprising for hedge funds that are private-
equity-like in their investment strategies, but it does not appear to be the way in
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equity strategies, fixed-income arbitrage, short-term event-driven trading, and the
like. If this notion is correct, the implications of the governance of most hedge funds
can best be understood by asking why they are not structured as some other type of
private partnership, not why they are not mutual funds.
3
This reasoning suggests the hedge fund universe can be decomposed into only two
groups for the purpose of understanding governance issues: those hedge funds that
engage in proprietary trading and those that are more like private equity partnerships.
This view might seem to be overly simplistic given the heterogeneity of the hedge fund
universe, but one can view most hedge funds as one type or the other, at least through
my rose-colored glasses. Accordingly, the next section discusses governance issues
associated with the particular needs of proprietary trading while the penultimate
section does the same for private equity. A brief conclusion rounds out the paper.
Organizational Form and Proprietary Trading
In my classification scheme, most of the hedge funds in the TASS categorization are
similar to proprietary trading desks. Convertible arbitrage, dedicated short bias
strategies, equity market neutral portfolios, fixed-income arbitrage, and managed
futures trading fit into this group. So do global macro funds to the extent that they
engage in frequent trading based on relative valuations of countries, sectors, or indi-
vidual firms. Most event-driven strategies other than distressed securities—such as
merger arbitrage, Regulation D funds, and high-yield (junk bond) portfolios—fit into
this group as well. The first two subsections that follow describe governance issues
associated with proprietary trading under the private partnership structure that used
to dominate the Wall Street investment houses and those under the public-company
form that followed. The last subsection contrasts these observations with the gover-
nance issues associated with hedge funds. 
A brief account of proprietary trading in private partnerships. The cor-
porate governance issues associated with proprietary trading used to be so simple. A
single structure—the conventional private partnership—dominated the industry
because investment banks and broker/dealers were structured that way.
4 Proprietary
trading was a natural outgrowth of the other business lines, particularly the synergy
between the dealer and investment banking functions. The “production function” of
proprietary trading involved two main capital inputs: human capital, which provided
the necessary skills, and access to financial capital. The former was bound to the firm
by the structure of partnership agreements that, in conjunction with the inventory of
securities held by the firm, provided the basis for brokers’ loans that funded its deal-
ing and trading.
Salomon Brothers in the mid-1970s provides a representative example.
5 The com-
pany’s average daily inventory was on the order of $6 billion in 1976, and the paid-in
capital of the firm was about $200 million. Book-value leverage was thirty to one
although leverage at market was much less since book value understated market
value. The inventory was used as collateral to obtain overnight brokers’ loans, which
were valued by Salomon and not by the lender. The firm also had general unsecured
debt obligations for which the general partners had unlimited liability.
The asset side of the balance sheet looked a bit different. On any given day, the
overall assets of the proprietary trading desks (V A) had three components: the value
of the long positions (V L), cash on hand devoted to margin requirements (CM), and
uncommitted cash (CU) or
VA = VL + CM + CU.
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tions or, after the introduction of financial derivatives, futures and options contracts.
The assets in which the firm invested were typically illiquid, making the true value of
long positions unobservable, suggesting that a potential moral hazard problem asso-
ciated with overnight brokers’ loans existed since Salomon set the price at which
securities were marked to market. Note also that one would need to drill down
beneath these numbers to get a handle on the risks incurred by the proprietary trad-
ing desks since losses on any short positions or on any leveraged long positions
required the use of uncommitted cash, increased borrowing, sales of existing long
positions, or covering existing short positions.
Personnel management in sales and trading—and, for that matter, investment bank-
ing and research—looked remarkably like that of a university. General partners in the
firm made up the senior faculty, limited partners were analogous to tenured associate
professors, and the remaining nonpartner professionals played the role of junior faculty.
The firm made “up or out” decisions regarding these junior faculty members four to seven
years after they joined the firm. Those who did not receive tenure by making limited
partner moved to another firm. Most of those denied tenure at the best Wall Street firms
found good jobs at other investment houses, as is typically the case in academia as well.
Compensation consisted of a relatively small base salary and a potentially large—
by the standards of the time—annual performance-based bonus.
6 The determination
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1. See Tremont Advisers and TASS Investment Research (2002). The TASS database (acquired by
Lipper research firm in 2005) is the leading industrial-quality hedge fund database, covering 6,600
hedge funds. 
2. Indeed, the empirical evidence confirms that a portfolio of hedge funds can have a lower standard
deviation than a single fund. The lower standard deviation, however, comes at a cost: A portfolio
of hedge funds has returns that are more skewed toward losses and more correlated with the stock
market than returns of single funds.
3. This view would be strained if the SEC weakened the qualified investor standard to permit the
creation of retail hedge funds with smaller investors of the sort found in Europe because the
organizational forms of such funds would likely differ substantially from those under the current
provisions. In addition, the argument for regulation predicated on investor protection consider-
ations would be stronger for such funds; see Edwards (2006) for a contrary view. At the Atlanta
Fed conference, SEC Commissioner Gay Huey Evans pointed out that the European experience
with retail hedge funds can provide much guidance in this regard.
4. The major New York commercial banks also had proprietary trading desks, devoted almost exclu-
sively to fixed-income securities. The banks were particularly active in government and municipal
bond trading. Thinking through the associated corporate governance issues is difficult because of
the regulated nature of commercial banks and, in particular, the role of deposit insurance.
5. What follows is based on my recollection of putting brokers’ loans together to fund the inventory in
the summer of 1975 and of keeping (approximate) daily profit and loss records for a number of trad-
ing desks in the summer of 1976. Salomon was lurching in the direction of more automated, near real-
time profit and loss calculations, which provided me with exposure to the major trading desks because
Profit Control, the group that performed this task, had to keep and reconcile two sets of books, the
old manual books and the new automated ones. One such desk was the arbitrage desk, which could,
in principle, make any relative value trade in any security. Common trades were convertible bond arbi-
trage, convertible preferred arbitrage, and relative value trades across and within sectors. Another
desk was the industrials desk, which handled sales and trading in such bonds and, as a consequence,
supported both the dealer and proprietary trading functions. It was here I learned that “summer kid”
could be a great job description since partners were delighted to answer my questions no matter how
dumb they were (the questions, not the partners). The word “lurching” in the foregoing refers to the
fact that automation did not go well initially and turned into a multiyear project.
6. The most extreme spread I recall was a trader who received $12,000 in salary and a bonus of
almost $500,000.
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of these bonuses was a contentious process that gave rise to much lobbying and to
occasional manipulation of the trading books. For general and limited partners, these
bonuses did not represent pure income: General partners had a mandatory plowback
ratio of 80 percent while that of limited partners was lower. Partners at Salomon
Brothers had a strong incentive to remain productive after tenure: In some sense,
they were asset rich and cash poor although they were hardly poverty stricken.
Now consider the structure of such firms from the perspective of agency theory.
In economic terms, their liabilities were collateralized and unsecured debt obligations
and an implicit claim on human capital in the form of the general and limited partners.
As was the norm, partners had unlimited
liability. Consequently, lenders were treat-
ing these investment banking/broker/dealer
firms like they were cash cows being milked
by the equityholders in the firm. Lenders
could reasonably count on the equityholders
to perform this task for at least three rea-
sons. First, the human capital was bound
to the firm by the plowback provisions of the partnership agreement. Second, part-
nership shares were valued at cost until sometime around the onset of retirement, fur-
ther binding the partners to the firm. Finally, more productive partners received
higher fractional ownership through the bonus system, ensuring that the best traders
and investment bankers served on the important committees and, thus, closely over-
saw the business activities of the firm.
7
A brief account of proprietary trading in public corporations. This struc-
ture remained in place at most Wall Street firms until the late 1970s. Around that
time, such firms started to change their corporate form to become public corporations.
8
The binding of human capital to the firm via plowback provisions and book-value
accounting was not sustainable for most of the industry as competitors lured produc-
tive general and, to a greater extent, limited partners with substantial signing bonuses.
Even Goldman Sachs, which had a long-standing policy of not making lateral hires from
other firms, began to do so in 1990 to stem the outflow of human capital even while it
remained a private partnership. Most firms remained extremely profitable as public
companies during this transition even if they did have some spectacularly bad years. 
Proprietary trading in public corporations differs from that in a private partner-
ship in two main ways. First, the opportunity cost of capital tends to fall since the
idiosyncratic risk is spread over a diversified shareholder base. Second, this benefit
has a cost: the agency problems engendered by the separation of ownership and con-
trol. These problems are qualitatively different from those in the typical public corpo-
ration because of the nature of proprietary trading. The asset side of the balance
sheet is identical to that for proprietary trading within private partnerships since
VA = VL + CM + CU, and large gains or losses on the long or short positions can dramat-
ically change the capital allocated to the trading desks and, with it, the corresponding
risk exposures and leverage. 
Agency theory suggests that the lack of transparency regarding profitability, risk
exposure, liquidity, and leverage in proprietary trading under the corporate form nat-
urally creates substantial problems for external monitors. To be sure, compensation
in the form of performance-based bonuses and executive stock options can mitigate
these problems to some extent. However, there is little doubt that performance-
based compensation without explicit external monitoring is an imperfect substitute
for direct monitoring under those conditions in which good governance is especially
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I argue that the governance issues associ-
ated with hedge funds are best understood
by looking at other limited partnerships or
public firms that are similar in terms of
assets or liabilities.important: when actual or pending losses plunge the firm into financial distress.
Proprietary trading typically accounts for a disproportionate amount of firm risk and,
with it, the risk of financial distress. All of the usual costs of financial distress are
potentially at work here: the myopic focus on short-term gain at the expense of good
long-term decisions and the incentive to allocate scarce capital to excessively risky
strategies for a modest probability of great gains and away from good, but modestly
profitable, ones. 
Moreover, the corporate analogues of the full and limited partners are relatively
cash rich and (firm-specific) asset poor. After all, human capital in the form of skill
at proprietary trading is an almost tangible asset that can be freely transferred across
firms although distinguishing good luck from good policy is sometimes hard. In other
words, the human capital of proprietary traders is not bound to the public firm as it
was under private partnerships. Shareholders implicitly look to the franchise value—
that is, the value of the brand or the reputation of investment banking/broker/deal-
ers organized as public corporations—to provide appropriate incentives to managers.
The hedge fund form and proprietary trading. The types of hedge funds men-
tioned at the beginning of the section seem to me to be analogues of proprietary trad-
ing desks because their strategies ultimately profit from the same drivers. One such
strategy is the provision of liquidity in illiquid markets faced with unexpected demands
for immediacy that are not value related. Another is market timing that involves taking
positions before other momentum, contrarian, or event-driven traders decide to make
similar bets. An example of the former involves taking positions in mortgage-backed
securities when regulations affecting savings and loans require them to change the size
of their mortgage portfolios, a motive for trade that is hardly value related. If other
traders do not take the opposite side of their trades, the hedge fund will take a sub-
stantial haircut for doing so, an outcome that can be viewed as selling immediacy when
it is dear. An example of the latter is short-term currency trading at global macro hedge
funds, which typically involves guessing better than the crowd where the crowd is
headed. Such trades can be viewed as transferring liquidity over time (that is, buying
immediacy when it is cheap and selling it later when it is predicted to be expensive),
or they can be viewed as directional bets or as contributions to price discovery.
The capital and risk structures of proprietary trading operations are essentially
the same across organizational forms. Here, too, traders take long positions in some
securities and short positions in others. Hence, the capital committed to proprietary
trading is made up of uninvested cash, the cash dedicated to the margin require-
ments for the relevant asset and derivatives positions, and the market value of the
long positions. That is, VA = VL + CM + CU for these sorts of hedge funds as well. One
simply cannot look at the books of a convertible arbitrage, short or long/short port-
folio, fixed-income arbitrage, managed futures portfolio, or short-term event-driven
strategy and tell its underlying governance structure. 
The question at hand, however, is how hedge fund governance structures and
their concomitant moral hazard problems compare with those of otherwise similar
entities in private partnerships and public companies. One natural solution—the one
that is codified in the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts of 1940—
is periodic reporting of the asset side of hedge fund balance sheets, fiduciary obliga-
tions, and restrictions on position sizes, short sales, and leverage. However, limited
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7. This last aspect was not universal. For example, Goldman Sachs allocated ownership shares
primarily on the basis of seniority until 1990.
8. Until about 1970 the law prohibited the incorporation of investment banks.
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partnerships that function as proprietary trading hedge funds follow strategies that
are trade secrets, making disclosure requirements more burdensome. Moreover, they
routinely use short sales and leverage, and their assets are typically less liquid, making
marking to market more problematic. Even if these barriers can be overcome, hedge
fund trading strategies are so dynamic that “snapshots” such as quarterly reports are
an extremely unreliable guide to the recent history of their risk, return, and leverage
characteristics. Long positions become short positions, and leverage changes by an
order of magnitude so readily that periodic
reporting simply cannot play a role similar
to that in the mutual fund universe.
9
Put differently, the underlying econ-
omics of proprietary trading probably
means that such hedge funds cannot func-
tion as less highly regulated mutual funds
without nontrivial changes in regulatory
structure. Regulators can choose to make hedge funds conform to the disclosure obli-
gations and other requirements of mutual funds, but in so doing they will likely push
proprietary traders into other organizational forms that are probably less economi-
cally efficient or into other regulatory jurisdictions offshore. The transparency of
SEC-regulated funds would not appear to be an option for such hedge funds.
One dimension in which hedge funds differ from their investment banking/broker/
dealer predecessors arises from a change in legal technology. General partners, as well
as limited partners with control responsibilities, had unlimited personal liability under
the old structure. Partnerships can now create a limited liability corporation to serve
as the general partner, and the individual partners can be made into limited partners,
thus limiting their liability. Older firms that became public corporations probably would
have adopted this structure had they persisted as private partnerships; Goldman
Sachs, the last of the major Wall Street partnerships to go public, was organized in
this fashion well before its initial public offering in 1998. Hence, the stronger incen-
tives associated with the unlimited liability of general partners in the ancien régime
would have disappeared in all likelihood and, with them, the comparative merits of
hedge fund governance structures in this dimension.
That said, the limited partners in hedge funds are glorified creditors, not active
participants in the day-to-day operations of the business. Under the old structure,
senior and junior partners, along with relevant nonpartner employees implicitly and
sometimes formally and explicitly, monitored each other, mitigating to some extent
the moral hazard problems afflicting external creditors and internal equityholders. As
is the case with the corporate form, performance-based compensation alone is an
imperfect substitute for explicit monitoring in the presence of moral hazard. 
However, the governance structure of hedge funds improves on that of public
companies with regard to moral hazard in three ways. First, hedge fund managers
receive a more refined performance-based fee, the high-water-mark contract. Second,
managerial wealth is managed inside the fund. Third, managers are bound to the fund
to some extent via exit restrictions. 
The high-water-mark contract more closely aligns managerial incentives with those
of the limited partners in the hedge fund. A recipient of conventional performance-
based compensation receives a specified fraction of any increase in net asset value
over the evaluation period when returns are positive and nothing when they are not.
The high-water-mark contract differs in the baseline for the calculation: the highest
net asset value attained by the fund at any time on or before the beginning of the
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The underlying economics of proprietary
trading probably means that such hedge
funds cannot function as less highly regu-
lated mutual funds without nontrivial
changes in regulatory structure.evaluation period. Thus, the general partners of a hedge fund receive the perfor-
mance bonus only when the net asset value of the fund at the end of the evaluation
period exceeds the high-water mark, not when annual returns are positive during the
evaluation period. That is, managers are not compensated for returns obtained by
simply reversing prior losses.
A second device directly exposes hedge fund managers to downside risk as well. In
the typical hedge fund, all partners and sufficiently senior employees invest the bulk of
their wealth in the fund (or fund family) and manage their major liabilities such as
home mortgages within the partnership as well. Both income and wealth are perfor-
mance based in these circumstances, which makes for a more powerful incentive than
performance-based income alone. Note that the marginal incentive to take on too much
risk stemming from the optionlike payoff of the high-water-mark contract is counter-
balanced to some extent by the increased exposure to downside risk engendered by
this aspect of the partnership structure. Of course, the precise balance between these
opposing incentives cannot be determined without knowledge of the precise structure
of these contracts, the nature of the assets and liabilities of the fund, the size of the
management team’s position in the fund (particularly in relation to the upside poten-
tial of the high-water-mark contract), and the risk aversion of the management team.
Finally, hedge fund managers are bound to the firm more tightly than their
analogues in publicly owned firms. To some extent, their partnership agreements
typically make it difficult for them to leave the fund, binding them to it much as plow-
back provisions, book-value accounting, and annual bonuses did in the earlier private
partnerships. Moreover, the formal strictures may well be weaker than the informal
ones because of the rewards to reputation in this industry. Here, too, the increase in
downside risk exposure created by this aspect of the limited partnership structure
serves to counterbalance risk-seeking incentives to some extent.
Clearly, the incentives associated with the typical hedge fund governance struc-
ture are far stronger than their analogues for proprietary trading groups, broadly
defined, at public corporations.
10 By the same token, these incentives are probably
weaker than those associated with proprietary trading within the old investment
banking/broker/dealer private partnerships. The strengthening of incentives comes
at a cost: The principals in these organizations bear more fund-specific risk when
their wealth is more closely related to the fortunes of the fund.
11
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9. It is also hard to see a need for regulation in this regard since routine disclosure could be—and often
is—part of the partnership agreement. Qualified investors should have the necessary acumen and
resources to demand and obtain such provisions if they increase value. One putative benefit of
government-mandated, as opposed to contractual, disclosure is that only the former can be
backed with criminal sanctions. 
10. One modest benefit of the public form might be that the managers of proprietary trading groups,
the analogues of the general partners in hedge funds, can be dismissed for poor performance in
the corporation, while firing the managing partners of hedge funds is more problematic. More infor-
mation regarding hedge partnership agreements would be necessary to assess the difficulty in
doing so. As Ken Scott pointed out in his discussion of this paper at the Atlanta Fed conference,
any collective-action problem is more easily solved in the hedge fund form because the number of
investors—and qualified investors at that—is smaller and because the investors are not subject to
the regulatory constraints on collective action contained in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or
to the 1968 Williams Act that amended it. That is, the management of a public firm can fire the
managers of its proprietary trading desks, but shareholders find it much harder to oust the manage-
ment of the firm should it fail to adequately monitor and control proprietary traders.
11. In his discussion (see footnote 10), Scott noted that comparing and contrasting the details of
actual hedge fund partnership agreements would be useful.
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Hence, the opportunity cost of capital or required rate of return will typically
depend on total risk, not just systematic or market risk, in these circumstances. The
high-water-mark contract, the commitment of managerial wealth to the fund, and any
exit restrictions increase the idiosyncratic risk exposure of the hedge fund manage-
ment team compared with that of proprietary trading groups within a public corpora-
tion. By the same token, proprietary trading within the old private partnerships bound
the principals even more tightly to the fortunes of the firm. Consequently, the oppor-
tunity cost of capital implicit in the hedge fund organizational form will typically be
higher than that for comparable entities within public corporations and lower than
that associated with the private partnerships that used to dominate Wall Street.
12
Hedge Funds That Trade on Corporate Governance
Most types of hedge funds are the functional equivalent of proprietary trading desks,
but an important class of hedge funds that bet on corporate governance remains:
those that invest in assets that are expected to appreciate over the medium term
because of the general partner’s skill and acumen in finding, funding, and managing
investment opportunities. The governance issues associated with proprietary trading
involve the incentive effects on the liability side of the balance sheet. The governance
issues associated with this type of hedge fund involve the asset side of the balance
sheet and, in particular, the governance issues associated with the assets themselves. 
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to contrast this type of hedge fund with private
equity more broadly defined. Both hedge funds and private equity funds such as buy-
out funds are organized as limited partnerships. However, private equity partnerships
have a contractual life of ten to twelve years—called the lockup period—in which the
general partner chooses a portfolio of companies from a prespecified asset class over
five to seven years, and the limited partners provide the capital to fund these invest-
ments. Since there is a long lockup period and since the limited partners cannot hope
to measure the value of the portfolio of companies until the assets are liquidated, the
limited partners implicitly rely on the compensation structure to provide appropriate
incentives to the general partner. To oversimplify matters, the standard contract
involves a fixed fee that pays the salaries of the management team and other costs of
doing business, incentive compensation that is a fraction of the profits, and a hurdle
rate that governs the payments that must be paid to the limited partners before the
incentive fee is paid.
13
Private-equity-like hedge funds. Private-equity-like hedge funds have shorter
lockup periods. Limited partners may be required to keep their funds invested for
one to three years, after which time they may be permitted to withdraw funds each
quarter. The asset menu of such hedge funds can make the de facto lockup period
longer than the de jure one: Marking to market is done by the general partner, giving
the manager considerable latitude when the assets in question are highly illiquid.
That said, the asset classes for which the hedge fund structure is viable are made up
of investment opportunities expected to be profitable over the intermediate term.
The hedge fund form with a comparatively short lockup period will work only for
such asset classes.
14
In addition, the compensation structure of such hedge funds has nothing spe-
cial about it relative to conventional private equity limited partnerships. If the
assets are sufficiently liquid, the natural form of incentive compensation is the high-
water-mark contract; if they are not, the high-water-mark contract is not viable,
and so the incentive contract is of the type found in private equity firms described
briefly above.
15
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA Distressed securities represent one such investment opportunity. The skill sets of
the general partners of such funds include the ability to identify firms that have a real
chance of climbing out of their distressed circumstances, to acquire a controlling
interest in the firm at prices that represent substantial discounts, and to manage the
bankruptcy or reorganization process. Such skills make it possible to identify and
purchase undervalued distressed securities, usually distressed debt. 
The hedge fund cannot expect to profit by selling distressed debt before the firm
exits financial distress; high adverse selection costs exist because potential buyers
know that resellers are potentially much better informed than they are, and this high
adverse selection risk implies a correspondingly large haircut. Hence, the limited
partners understand the risk that the de facto lockup period will exceed the de jure
one. Put differently, limited partners will only want to liquidate their positions and,
thus, force the general partner to sell the distressed debt in the marketplace when it
becomes sufficiently implausible that the general partner will be able to successfully
bring the portfolio companies out of financial distress.
16
Hedge funds that specialize in buyouts also differ from their private equity counter-
parts in the horizon over which candidate buyouts are expected to be profitable. This
sort of buyout fund typically acquires divisions of large firms that want to concentrate
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12. I would hardly expect this ordering to hold uniformly. The asset, liability, compensation, and legal
structures of hedge funds contain many moving parts, and the balance across these factors can
reverse this ordering in particular cases. For example, one can view the decision of the group led
by John Meriwether at Salomon Brothers to form Long-Term Capital Management as one based
on the impact of organizational form on the opportunity cost of capital. However, the implicit
opportunity cost of capital for the Meriwether group appeared to fall when they left Salomon
Brothers, in contradiction to the argument in the text.
All of the great Wall Street partnerships of the last century are now organized as public cor-
porations, a change that was accompanied by the consolidation of these former partnerships as
well. This observation suggests that the reduction in the opportunity cost of capital of large public
companies or hedge funds outweighs the potential improvement in governance associated with
private partnerships. To be sure, there are still private partnerships engaged in proprietary trading,
but they tend to be smaller boutique or niche firms. Perhaps the signal sent by tying the fortunes
of the partners more tightly to the profit and loss of the proprietary trading operation is sufficiently
valuable for partnerships with less reputational capital.
13. The prevailing incentive contract is more like the dividend on a preferred stock—in fact, the
industry refers to it as a preferred return or hurdle rate—than it is like the high-water-mark con-
tract. Viewed as an option, the contract moves the strike price each period by the hurdle rate.
The limited partners receive this dividend—which is a fraction of the capital committed by the
limited partner—but, if the dividend is not paid, it accrues so that the limited partners receive
the cumulative dividend with interest. Once the preferred return is paid in full to the limited part-
ners, subsequent income pays the cumulative incentive fee to the general partner, and, once this
fee is paid in full, subsequent income is divided between the general and limited partners in
accordance with the contract. This description offers a bare outline of the standard contract;
many variations on this theme exist in the industry.
14. One way to get around lockup provisions without forcing the fund to sell securities is for the
hedge fund to make in-kind payments to investors. Many hedge funds transfer illiquid securities
to investors through a vehicle called a special investment account, termed a side pocket in the
industry. Side pockets can resolve the problem of lockups, but, by themselves, they do not solve
the valuation and agency problems that make the securities in question illiquid in the first place. 
15. Here, too, side pockets can be used to some extent to make incentive compensation more like
that in the high-water-mark contract.
16. Perhaps this gap between de facto and de jure lockups can be mitigated to some extent with con-
ditional lockup provisions that permit more rapid withdrawals when adverse circumstances arise
that are observable to the general partners in real time and to the limited partners ex post. 
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on their core business or small firms that are in the later stages of incubation by ven-
ture capitalists. The general partners of these funds expect to profit by using their
managerial expertise to nurture the growth of the target firms or by finding synergies
among several target firms and then bundling them together. Gone, for the most part,
is the “buy and bust up” form of buyout fund that was so popular in the 1980s.
That said, the moral hazard problems inherent in the corporate form that lever-
aged buyout firms were designed, in part, to address remain nontrivial ones. The
menu of problems includes large cash positions that incumbent management may use
inefficiently, unexploited tax shields asso-
ciated with too little leverage, poison pills
that insulate management from the mar-
ket for corporate control, and staggered
voting that ensures that only a fraction of
the board of directors can be replaced at
any time, thus facilitating corporate crony-
ism. However, leveraged buyouts and even
distressed debt acquisition to some extent are blunt tools for dealing with such
problems unless the target firm requires sweeping changes.
Activist hedge funds. Activist hedge funds target public companies, the per-
formance of which they hope to improve with better corporate governance. Such
funds take a minority position in the firm—sometimes several hedge funds target the
same firm—but do not seek to acquire the firm or even control it. Their aim is to use
their minority position to lobby incumbent management to make specific changes in
governance such as disgorging excess cash, increasing leverage, and revoking poison-
pill and staggered-voting provisions in the corporate charter. They acquire their toe-
holds in secret and hope to profit from increased share prices if they are successful. 
Since they lobby publicly from a minority position, activist hedge funds typically
seek (and probably require) more traditional stockholders to agree with proposed
governance changes, making this strategy similar to virtuous greenmail when it
works in this fashion. Of course, sometimes the entrenched management will simply
pay the activist fund to go away, payments that are implicitly paid for by the dispersed
shareholder base. That is, not all greenmail is virtuous.
The very public nature of their activities in the market for corporate control after
the toehold is acquired mitigates considerably the moral hazard problems confronting
the limited partners. Here too a substantial difference can exist between the de facto
and de jure lockup periods, but the difference is, to some extent, a choice made by
the limited partners, not one forced by the general partner. Limited partners in activist
hedge funds can make their own assessments of the likelihood that the attempt at
greenmail will be successful, and therefore they are far better situated to implicitly
mark the hedge funds’ assets to market than are limited partners of buyout and dis-
tressed securities funds. These partners are also better able to assess the impact of
any failure to effect changes in governance on share values.
As with hedge funds that function as proprietary trading desks, the moral haz-
ard problem prior to the acquisition of the toehold cannot be solved via the disclo-
sure provisions of the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts of 1940
without seriously affecting the opportunity set of distressed debt, buyout, and
activist hedge funds. Any revelation of the firms that are “in play” will increase the
share, debt, or overall firm prices. Put differently, these hedge funds also follow
investment strategies that are trade secrets, the value of which will be diminished
by periodic disclosure. 
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Hedge fund trading strategies are so dynamic
that “snapshots” such as quarterly reports
are an extremely unreliable guide to the
recent history of their risk, return, and
leverage characteristics.Conclusion
The central tenet of this paper is that the governance issues associated with hedge
funds are best understood by looking at other limited partnerships or public firms
that are similar in terms of either their assets or liabilities. If this view is correct, the
costs and benefits associated with the hedge fund form should be compared with
those of otherwise similar entities that are organized differently. Hedge funds should
fall more under the purview of the SEC’s regulations governing broker/dealers, public
corporations, or limited partnerships than under its regulations regarding mutual funds
and money managers. The agency problems are more like those at Enron, Goldman
Sachs, or law partnerships than they are like those at Vanguard or Fidelity. 
The theory, such as it is, in this paper is largely descriptive, providing a frame-
work for thinking about governance issues in hedge funds. The discussion implicitly
explains why proprietary-trading-like hedge funds replaced the unlimited liability
partnerships of the Wall Street investment houses that preceded them: Unlimited lia-
bility partnerships require higher opportunity costs of capital than hedge funds with
strong incentive contracts. Similarly, the separation of ownership and control associ-
ated with proprietary trading in a public firm suggests that this organizational form
is viable only for those entities that have substantial franchise values based on reputa-
tion. From this perspective, private-equity-like hedge funds are seen to be like niche
firms carved out from the larger private equity universe with time horizons that are
shorter and underlying assets that are more liquid or that can be more readily valued
by limited partners.
As such, the analysis does not provide ready answers to the question of how best
to improve hedge fund governance. To do so would require an explicit analysis of the
trade-offs associated with different organizational forms that facilitates the calculation
of the net burden of regulation. For example, more stringent disclosure requirements
for private-equity-like hedge funds regarding later-stage changes in portfolio company
valuations might well be a good idea. However, any case for imposing such require-
ments would necessarily rest on identifying the market failure that prevents general
partners from committing to the provision of such information in the current regula-
tory regime. The analysis in this paper provides the scaffolding for assessing the net
burden of regulation, but the real heavy lifting requires a more detailed explication
of the nature of and limits to contractibility in these markets.
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